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Securitisation and the Construction of Security 
Matt McDonald, Warwick 
Forthcoming in European Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (2008) 
Those interested in the construction of security in contemporary international politics 
have increasingly turned to the conceptual framework of ‘securitisation’. This article 
argues that while an important and innovative contribution, the securitisation 
framework is narrow in three senses. First, the form of act constructing security is 
defined narrowly, with the focus on the speech of dominant actors. Second, the 
context of the act is defined narrowly, with the focus only on the moment of 
intervention. Finally, the framework of securitisation is narrow in the sense that the 
nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats. In outlining 
these critiques, the article points to possibilities for developing the framework further 
as well as for the need for those applying it to recognise both limits of their claims 
and the normative implications of their analysis. I conclude by pointing to how the 
framework might fit within a research agenda concerned with the broader 
construction of security.  
 
Those interested in the construction of security in contemporary international politics- 
the process through which ‘security’ and ‘security threats’ are brought into being in 
particular political contexts- have increasingly turned to the Copenhagen School 
approach to provide an analytical framework for their analyses. Most prominently, of 
course, has been the use of the central organising concept of ‘securitisation’ to point 
to the discursive construction of particular issues as security threats.1
 
 This conceptual 
framework has been variously applied to issues such as immigration, health, political 
dissidence and minority rights, particularly in the context of the post-2001 US-led 
‘war on terror’.  
This article argues that while an important and innovative contribution to our 
understanding of security and its construction, the securitisation framework is 
problematically narrow in three basic senses. First, the form of act constructing 
                                                 
1 Wæver (2004) identifies ‘securitisation’ as one of three central concepts for the Copenhagen School- 
with ‘sectors’ and ‘regional security complexes’ as the others. However the latter are ultimately 
deemed significant for the broader theory as sites for securitisation dynamics and practices. 
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security is defined narrowly, with the focus on the speech of dominant actors, usually 
political leaders. This excludes a focus on other forms of representation (images or 
material practices, for example), and also encourages a focus only on the discursive 
interventions of those voices deemed institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of a 
particular collective, usually a state. Second, the context of the act is defined 
narrowly, with the focus only on the moment of intervention. The potential for 
security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and 
representations is not addressed here, and the question of why particular 
representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under-theorised in this 
framework.2
 
 Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the framework of 
securitisation is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms 
of the designation of threats to security. This focus ignores the central importance of 
the way in which security (as a normative goal or expression of core values) is 
understood in particular contexts. It also suggests that security acquires content only 
through representations of danger and threat. Such a framework encourages a 
conceptualisation of security politics as inherently negative and reactionary. 
A range of scholarship has highlighted a number of these problems in various forms.3
                                                 
2 This is given brief expression (in Wæver (2000:252-3); and Buzan et al. (1998:31-3)) in discussion of 
the conditions of a felicitous speech act (described as ‘facilitating conditions), to be discussed later in 
this article.  
 
But outlining the narrow scope of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework 
here regarding the broader construction of security is important analytically and 
normatively. The article develops three forms of critique with different objectives, 
linked to specific dimensions of narrowness. The first concerns issues or dynamics 
mentioned but underspecified in the securitisation framework, most prominently the 
3 See, for example, McSweeney (1999); Knudsen (2001); Hansen (2000); Balzacq (2005); Aradau 
(2004); Williams (2003); Doty (1998/9); Booth (2005). 
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context of the speech act. Here, I suggest that dynamics such as the role of 
‘facilitating conditions’ and the ‘audience’ are so under-theorised as to ultimately 
remain outside the framework itself, and would benefit from being both brought in 
and drawn out. The point of outlining this form of narrowness is therefore to suggest 
the need to better integrate (where possible) various dimensions of the construction of 
security recognised as important within the Copenhagen School literature so as to 
strengthen the framework itself. 
 
The second problematic dimension of narrowness addressed here are questions and 
dynamics neglected within the framework itself, including most prominently the 
questions of why particular representations of threat resonate with particular 
communities, and how particular actors are either empowered or marginalised in 
‘speaking’ security. The goal here is twofold. First and most importantly, it is to 
suggest that the securitisation framework should not be viewed as shorthand for the 
broader construction of security. Second, it is to raise questions about whether the 
framework itself captures the most important dynamics of that which it is trying to 
explain.  
 
While the above analytical issues are clearly important, perhaps more important is the 
third problematic dimension of narrowness: points where the narrow nature of the 
framework has problematic normative implications. Here, I focus on the role of the 
framework in reifying both dominant voices and traditional security discourses that fit 
most squarely within the Copenhagen School’s logic of security. The goal here is to 
point to some of these implications and suggest that those working within this 
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tradition need to be reflective about these implications and their potential contribution 
to leaving power ‘where it is’ in security terms.  
 
I conclude the article by suggesting what a broader approach to the construction of 
security might look like and what role the securitisation framework might play in this 
approach. Those interested in the construction of security, I would argue, would do 
well to focus on understanding the processes through which particular definintions or 
discourses of security come to constitute the lens through which specific issues are 
conceptualised and addressed by different political communities. Employing this 
focus necessarily entails a move beyond the depiction through speech of issues as 
existential threats to those communities, although there would still be an important 
role for this form of analysis. A broader approach to the construction of security also 
entails a focus on how political communities themselves are constituted (beyond the 
designation of threat), how particular articulations of security come to capture the way 
that community deals with those issues, and potentially locating and acknowledging 
alternative articulations of security, especially those outlined by marginalised voices.  
 
Copenhagen and the Designation of Threat 
 
The Copenhagen School has been particularly successful in developing a concept that 
has found a place in the lexicon of international relations thought, evidenced by the 
number and scope of publications working with its central concept of ‘securitisation’ 
or some variation of it. Securitisation has been applied to analyses of state foreign 
policy behaviour (Smith 2005; Abrahamsen 2005), to the construction of transnational 
crime (Emmers 2003) and HIV/AIDS as security threats (Elbe 2006), to various 
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dimensions of the ‘war on terror’ (Buzan 2006), and to minority rights (Roe 2004). 
Most prominently, there is now a vast array of analyses of the securitisation of 
migration, particularly since 2001.4 Recent trends in post-structural analyses of 
security, meanwhile, associated with the notion of the ‘exception’, exhibit strong 
parallels with the Copenhagen conception of securitisation as that process which takes 
an issue beyond or outside ‘normal’ politics (Huysmans 2004; Walker ed. 2006). And 
this is to say nothing of the myriad attempts to debate, clarify and amend the 
framework itself, of which this article obviously constitutes a part.5
 
 That 
‘securitisation’ has entered the language of international relations and security studies 
is therefore not up for question. Nor should such a development be viewed as a 
negative one, particularly given the capacity for such a conceptual framework to 
illuminate key elements of the ways in which security preferences and practices are 
constructed in international politics. What is problematic is that ‘securitisation’ is 
often viewed as short-hand for the construction of security, and that the assumption of 
security politics as negative and exclusionary is rarely interrogated beyond the 
particular contexts in which the framework is applied (eg immigration in liberal 
democratic states post-2001).  
Developing in the context of research on European security dynamics (Buzan et al. 
1990; Wæver et al. 1993), the securitisation concept first entered international 
relations vernacular after being outlined by Ole Wæver (1995) in the mid-1990s, and 
received its fullest treatment in the 1998 book Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. In his initial articulations of the concept, Wæver defined security as a 
‘speech act’, with securitisation referring to that form of linguistic representation that 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Bigo and Walker (eds.) (2002); Guild (2003); Sasse (2005); and Huysmans (2006). 
5 Of a now significant body of literature, see Knudsen (2001); McSweeney (1996); Huysmans (1998); 
Williams (1998); Balzacq (2005); and Stritzel (forthcoming).  
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positioned a particular issue as an existential threat. While this characterisation was 
broadly echoed in the 1998 text, the authors here began to place increased emphasis 
on the role of constituencies or audiences in ‘backing up’ speech acts (Buzan et al 
1998:26-33). Here, speech acts were defined as ‘securitising moves’ that became 
securitisations through audience consent. The emphasis in the framework therefore 
arguably shifted from speech acts as productive of security to speech acts as one 
component of the inter-subjective construction of security, although this might also be 
viewed as a tension within the framework itself.6
 
 I will return to this issue later in the 
article.  
Another tension or development concerned the role of desecuritisation. In Wæver’s 
initial statement on securitisation, the normative imperative of desecuritisation 
(removing issues from security agenda) was positioned as a central concern, one 
reflected in the title of his 1995 chapter (‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation’). For 
Wæver (1995:56-7), ‘security’ constituted the opposite of ‘politics’, the latter 
implying the possibility for more open engagement and dialogue.7
                                                 
6 On this point, see Stritzel (forthcoming). 
 To be sure, the 
characterisation of security and securitisation as a failure of normal politics and as a 
(usually) normatively regressive development was not abandoned in later work (eg 
Buzan et al 1998:29; Wæver 2000:253; Wæver 2004). This normative imperative was 
certainly downplayed, however, relative to the emphasis on the development of a 
conceptual and analytical framework for understanding or explaining security 
dynamics.  
7 For an alternative view on the extent to which desecuritization can be viewed as an essentially 
normative argument, see Rita Taureck (2006). It should be noted here that even in his earlier work 
Wæver (1995) did not reject outright the utility or benefit of securitizing particular issues, although an 
overarching normative preference for desecuritization has been consistently advanced, while the view 
of securitization as a negative development is implicit in articulations of the dichotomy between 
security and politics. 
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There have been, of course, a range of other attempts to develop the concept over 
time. These have included the attempt to apply earlier insights from analyses of 
European security dynamics (Buzan et al 1993) and security generally (Buzan 1983) 
to the developing concept of securitisation, particularly evident in the attempt to 
locate different dynamics of securitisation in different contexts or ‘sectors’ (Buzan et 
al 1998). The attempt to develop the concept was also evident in efforts to define 
more precisely the conditions that might enable a securitising move to be successful: 
its ‘facilitating conditions’. The focus here was on the form of the act, position of 
speaker and historical resonance of particular ‘threats’ (Wæver 2000:252-3). It is 
worth recognising in all these cases that rather than constituting a monolithic 
approach to security, subtle differences in emphasis and scope of the conceptual 
framework are evident even among its chief architects- the ‘Copenhagen School’- 
over time, in different contexts, and depending on the combination of authors 
involved.  
 
Ultimately, and in spite of these subtle differences in emphasis and even content, 
securitisation can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a 
political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the 
consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension 
of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue.  
 
The applicability of this concept to the most common case study noted- liberal 
democratic states’ approach to immigrants and asylum-seekers- is readily apparent. 
Since 2001 in particular there has been an increased incidence of representations of 
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immigrants and asylum-seekers as threatening the sovereignty and identity of these 
nation-states. The relevance of the securitisation framework is also apparent given 
that immigrants and asylum-seekers are generally outside the gaze of traditional 
security analysts, even while both the language used in characterising these people 
and attempts to respond to the ‘threat’ they pose (through military deployment or the 
tightening of border controls) are characteristic of traditional security practices. 
Further, given that such states are often liberal democracies, and signatories to 
relevant international or regional agreements on population movements, the 
dichotomy between security and politics that the securitisation framework subscribes 
to seems to work well. There is clearly a choice to characterise immigrants as 
threatening, one that is often communicated by political leaders to domestic 
constituents, and one that seems to justify emergency measures and the suspension of 
the normal rules of the game (whether defined in terms of domestic political debate or 
adherence to international rules and norms). Securitisation illuminates these dynamics 
well, and it is no surprise that it has been seen as aiding our understanding of political 
responses to population movements in Europe, for example.8
 
  
Even here, however, the securitisation framework has not been without its critics. 
Roxanne Lynn Doty (1998/9) has argued that immigration can be and has been 
approached through alternative understandings or discourses of security that avoid 
positioning the immigrant as a security ‘threat’, and even prioritise the needs and 
concerns of immigrants. Such an argument is inconsistent with the ultimate focus in 
the securitisation framework on the designation of threats. And there is a broader, 
more fundamental argument that while helpful, the securitisation framework takes us 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Huysmans (2006); Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002); and Sasse (2005). 
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only part of the way in understanding the dynamics through which immigrants and 
asylum-seekers come to be conceptualised and addressed as threatening. How do 
some articulations of security and threat come to resonate with particular 
constituencies, and how do we know when they do? Through what processes are some 
actors empowered to ‘speak’ security on behalf of particular communities? And to 
what extent are there alternative articulations of security, and how have these voices 
been silenced or delegitimised? The preceding questions hint at the central argument 
of this article: that the securitisation framework (while useful) is narrow in ways that 
are both analytically and normatively problematic, providing a partial account of the 
construction of security and potentially reifying traditional security discourses and 
practices in the process. The following sections explore these points in more detail, 
suggesting the need to expand on important issues recognised but not integrated 
within the framework. And while the framework itself could be strengthened in 
particular ways, I suggest the need to move beyond it for a fuller understanding of 




For the Copenhagen School, issues become security issues (or more accurately 
threats) through language. It is language that positions specific actors or issues as 
existentially threatening to a particular political community, thus enabling (or indeed 
constituting, depending on interpretation) securitisation. Indeed rather than simply 
being one ‘site’ of security construction, Wæver (1995) located the concept of 
securitisation itself in language theory, and particularly Austin’s articulation of the 
‘speech act’. In this framework, language itself becomes security in the sense that 
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particular forms of language- spoken or written in a particular context- constitute 
security. As Wæver argued (1995:55), ‘the utterance itself is the act…by uttering 
‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, 
and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it’.  
 
This reliance on language as the exclusive form of ‘securitising move’ is problematic 
for two reasons. First, language is only one (albeit the most central) means through 
which meaning is communicated (Möller 2007:180). A range of authors in this 
context have suggested the need to take account of the role of images as potential 
forms of securitisation. Second, an exclusive focus on language is problematic in the 
sense that it can exclude forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that do not 
merely follow from securitising ‘speech acts’ but are part of the process through 
which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed.   
 
As noted, a range of authors have suggested that images or visual representations can 
be central to the construction of security generally or even securitisation specifically. 
Michael Williams (2003) has suggested that television images of September 11- and 
in particular those of the World Trade Centre towers- were central to the development 
of dominant perceptions of security and threat in the American context. Frank Möller 
(2007) also discusses visual representations of the September 11 attacks- along with 
conflict in Iraq- in pointing to the ways in which photographic exhibitions are 
similarly able to communicate particular meanings of security and threat. Lene 
Hansen (forthcoming), meanwhile, uses the example of the cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper in 2005 in pointing to the potentially 
central role of visual representations as forms of securitisation.  
 11 
 
Extending the securitisation framework to include these forms of representation (as 
Williams suggests) would certainly be more reflective of the range of forms through 
which meaning- including about security and threat- can be communicated. But such 
inclusion may not be as simple as it appears. At a general level, the centrality of 
Austin’s theory of language to the broader framework suggests the need for 
developing or building on an alternative theory of the performative role of security 
representations. More specifically, the challenge for the Copenhagen School here may 
be that visual representations raise difficult questions about agency, intentionality and 
the importance of contestation over meaning.  
 
While the classical application of the securitisation framework has focused on the role 
of political leaders in the articulation and designation of threat, in the above examples 
of visual representation the key ‘securitising actors’ are artists and the media. 
Incorporating visual representation into the securitisation framework, therefore, may 
involve simultaneously rethinking the centrality that state political elite have in the 
framework itself. The role of intentionality is important in this context. Copenhagen 
School proponents portray a securitising move as a highly intentional, strategic action. 
Buzan et al. (1998:21) argue that the designation of ‘threats justifies the use of 
extraordinary measures to handle them’, further noting that the ‘invocation of security 
has been the key to legitimising the use of force’ (my emphases). More directly, 
Wæver (1995:63) has argued that ‘the logic around which the whole issue of security 
has been framed’ is ‘among strategic actors imbued with intentionality’. Such an 
image of strategic actors seeking to justify emergency responses arguably fits poorly 
with the communication of visual images, undertaken by actors (such as the media) 
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less likely to be seeking to engage in particular emergency measures or in a capacity 
to undertake them. And as Möller (2007:185) and Hansen (forthcoming) have argued, 
images are ambiguous in meaning, making it harder to control the meaning others 
take away from them. This renders the strategic use of images more difficult, while 
also pointing to the importance of contestation over meaning central to security 
politics.  
 
An alternative argument concerning the ‘narrowness’ of the Copenhagen School’s 
exclusive focus on speech is advanced by Didier Bigo (2002) and the so-called ‘Paris 
School’.9
 
 For these theorists, security is constructed and applied to different issues 
and areas through a range of often routinised practices rather than only through 
specific speech acts that enable emergency measures. Practices of surveillance and 
border controls, for example, particularly as undertaken by bureaucrats or 
‘professional managers of unease’ (Bigo 2002:65) are a central part of securitisation, 
and are not simply those actions enabled by preceding speech acts. For these theorists, 
‘to attend to the study of securitization is to focus on the creation of networks of 
professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive 
power of their practices’ (case 2006:458). This stands in opposition to the conception 
of security in the securitisation framework, in which security practices follow speech 
acts and in which security is the realm of dramatic emergency measures.    
Recognising the role of apparently mundane and everyday physical actions in the 
construction of security serves to question the speech-physical action sequence of the 
                                                 
9 Security theorists working within this approach, which draws on Bourdieu’s conception of the ‘field’ 
and Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’, include Didier Bigo, Jef Huysmans, Anastasia Tsoukala 
and Thierry Balzacq. For an account of the ‘Paris School’ approach to security, see case (2006:457-9); 
Wæver (2004). 
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securitisation framework and points to the multiple forms in which meaning can be 
communicated. The ‘everyday practices’ of the ‘managers of unease’, for example, 
would seem destined to be excluded from the securitisation framework, reliant as it is 
on a conception of the politics-security relationship that emphasises the extraordinary 
forms of action that follow from the construction of threats through speech. This maps 
on to criticisms raised by Hansen (2000:300-1) and Wilkinson (2007) that the 
Copenhagen School framework problematically neglects physical action generally, 
action which can serve to communicate ideas about security in their own right.10  It is 
far more possible to envisage images and visual representation being drawn into the 
securitisation framework as forms of ‘securitising moves’, a project advocated and 
furthered by Williams (2003) and Hansen (forthcoming) respectively.11
 
 But even here 
there are challenges, not least of all related to the questions of ambiguity, 
intentionality and the traditional centrality of speech and the speech act to the 
framework itself. 
 
Beyond the Speech Act 
 
Related to the above focus on the role of linguistic practices, it is also possible to 
argue that the securitisation framework is problematically narrow in its focus on the 
speech act relative to the social and political context in which the act itself occurs. 
Indeed, this is a problem acknowledged (but not fundamentally redressed) in Buzan et 
                                                 
10 On the role of physical action in the construction of security generally, see also Weldes et al 
(1999:16-17). 
11 Möller (2007) implies that images are most usefully viewed as enabling or encouraging subsequent 




 Put simply, in developing a universal framework for the designation or 
construction of threat through speech acts the Copenhagen School ultimately 
downplays the importance of contextual factors- such as dominant narratives of 
identity- that condition both patterns of securitisation and the broader construction of 
security. This is particularly curious given that Wæver has explored these contexts in 
detail elsewhere, linking security perspectives and actions to narratives of history and 
identity in European contexts (Wæver 1996; Hansen and Wæver eds. 2001).  
To the extent that there is engagement with the context of the speech act in the 
Copenhagen School, it has come in three central forms. The first is to suggest that we 
can see dynamics of securitisation playing out in different ‘sectors’. For these 
theorists, the designation of threat looks different in the context of military concerns 
than environmental ones, for example. Perhaps most prominent in these distinctions is 
that between societal and state sectors (Buzan et al 1993), the former defined in terms 
of the preservation of preferred identities and the latter in terms of the preservation of 
sovereignty (usually defined as non-intervention). This draws an important analytical 
distinction between often conflated referents of nation and state. However the division 
between sectors does not go far enough in recognising context, focusing only on 
different dynamics of securitisation across different issue areas rather than on the 
processes through which these security referents are themselves given meaning. And 
as Roxanne Lynn Doty argues (1998/9), drawing meaningful analytical distinctions 
between these sectors is sometimes difficult and often unhelpful. Political leaders can 
and do simultaneously invoke sovereignty and identity as that in need of preservation, 
                                                 
12 Here, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:41) acknowledge that ‘one danger of the phrases 
securitization and speech act is that too much focus can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging 
the powerful while marginalizing those who are the audience and judge of the act’. Emphasis in 
original. On this point, see also Hughes (2007) and Stritzel (forthcoming). 
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and attempting to compartmentalise security dynamics can obscure broader forms of 
discursive continuity in approaches to issues as disparate as immigration, 




The second form of engagement with contextual factors concerns the role of so-called 
‘facilitating conditions’, referring to those dynamics, developments and institutional 
contexts that enable ‘securitising moves’ to become successful. Here, Ole Wæver 
(2000:252-3), echoing the discussion in Buzan et al. (1998:31-3), has identified the 
importance of the form of the speech act; the role of the securitising actor; and the 
‘conditions historically associated with that threat’. The recognition of the latter two 
of these conditions- most prominently the third- certainly moves towards addressing 
the role of context. The problem here is more simply that this potentially important 
insight- which takes us beyond a set of strict criteria to be met in terms of the act of 
securitising- is not incorporated within the securitisation framework itself, which 
focuses overwhelmingly on the peformative role of the speech act rather than the 
conditions in which securitisation itself becomes possible (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 
72). It is not a coincidence that this dimension of the securitisation framework 
remains under-theorised and little-applied: examining historical ‘experiences’ with 
threat designation calls for a looser and highly interpretative approach to analysis 
which potentially conflicts with the Copenhagen School’s desire to develop a neat and 
coherent set of ‘requirements’ to be met for securitisation.    
 
                                                 
13 See, for example, McDonald (2005).  
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Finally, the securitisation framework engages with contextual factors in 
acknowledging the role of audiences and the importance of security pronouncements 
being ‘backed up’. This recognition would seem to be central to the broader 
recognition of the importance of context in the designation of security and threat, but 
there are two limitations here. The first is that, quite simply, what being ‘backed up’ 
means, how we know when it happens and what the implications are when it does not 
are radically under-theorised in the Copenhagen School. While recognising that 
security is inter-subjectively constructed, the focus on the speech act as performing 
security arguably paints security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation.  
 
Thierry Balzacq (2005) has suggested that the role of audiences is under-specified 
because of Wæver’s reliance on Austin’s theorisation of language. Here, the work is 
done by the articulation itself rather than the result of a negotiation between the 
articulator and the audience at whom the articulation is directed. More specifically, 
the power of the speech act would appear to be undermined by the full incorporation 
of the idea that the act itself is only one part of the securitising process: that it relies 
upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies.   
 
There are certainly opportunities here for counter-readings on this point. While 
retaining an emphasis on the productive nature of speech, Judith Butler (1997), for 
example, has suggested that Austin’s conception of the speech act implies the 
possibility that they can be either ‘perlocutionary’ (necessary for enabling particular 
actions) or ‘illocutionary’ (performing a function at the moment of speech). Allowing 
the possibility that speech acts are perlocutionary potentially enables greater attention 
to audiences who might either consent to particular actions suggested through speech 
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or engage in contesting the terms of the speech act or the actions suggested in 
response to it (Butler 1997:15). An alternative interpretation of the speech act might 
be that it serves to construct or produce the audience itself.14 Further, it might be 
suggested that the role audiences play is in helping to constitute speech communities 
in which particular forms of representation are intelligible and legitimate and others 
unintelligible and illegitimate (eg Fierke 1997). These are all particular readings of 
the ‘speech act’ that at some level constitute attempts to come to terms with the 
production-construction distinction, what Holger Stritzel (forthcoming) has defined as 
an ‘internalist-externalist’ distinction. The challenge for the securitisation framework 
in this sense is that the above are quite different in their conception of what speech 
acts are and how they relate to audiences. There is a clear need to clarify the position 
on the above points to draw the role of audiences into the framework more coherently, 
but in doing so the Copenhagen School will almost certainly need to downplay either 
the performative effects of the speech act or the inter-subjective nature of security.15
  
 
Ultimately, those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to the 
social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security (even 
those defined narrowly in terms of the designation and articulation of threat) become 
possible. Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and 
dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have 
in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitisation? To what extent is 
political possibility defined by the target audience of speech acts? How are some 
voices empowered or marginalised to define security and threat? These highly 
                                                 
14 Such a reading of the relationship between speech and audiences is evident in Althusser’s notion of 
interpellation, in which individuals are hailed into particular subject positions through speech. On its 
application to the discursive construction of security, see Jutta Weldes (1996).  
15 I am indebted to the anonymous referees on several of the points in this section. 
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contextual factors, I would suggest, are central to understanding how security works 
in different contexts, but are ultimately given short shrift in the securitisation 
framework. The appeal of universalism in the development of a conceptual 
framework goes some way towards explaining the neglect of contextual factors, but 
the failure also to draw out the ways in which securitising actors and audiences 
interact beyond the broad and amorphous recognition of ‘facilitating conditions’ and 
being ‘backed up’ by relevant audiences is unsatisfying. 
 
Beyond Dominant Voices 
 
To date I have focused on the ‘narrowness’ of the securitisation framework in 
analytical terms, suggesting the possibility for strengthening the framework by 
drawing out important elements of context and different forms of representation, for 
example, while also pointing to the limits and tensions within the framework that 
might make this difficult. I have also suggested in these contexts that it is important to 
avoid viewing the framework as short-hand for the broader construction of security. 
 
The question of which actors’ representations are viewed as significant within this 
framework, however, entails important normative commitments and has important 
normative implications. Put simply, the securitisation framework focuses on 
articulations capable of leading to change in practice, with the default position being a 
focus on the ‘securitisations’ of political leaders who are able to achieve a wide 
audience in their statements and interventions, and who are able to marshal the 
resources of the state to respond to the existential threat. As Wæver (1995:57) argues, 
‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’. 
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Such a focus serves to marginalise the experiences and articulations of the powerless 
in global politics, presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively 
consent to or contest securitising moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite 
discourses. 
 
In perhaps the clearest statement of this limitation, Lene Hansen (2000) has discussed 
the ways in which the focus on speech acts means contributing to the silencing of 
women, whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is neglected in a 
framework that focuses on the articulations of the powerful: of those whose voices 
can be heard and of those whose successful attempts at securitisation can result in the 
enactment of emergency measures. Such a framework clearly has little to say about 
the plight of the most vulnerable in global politics and their experiences of- and 
engagement with- security and threat. Indeed for Hansen, the Copenhagen School 
does not simply neglect the experiences of women but in fact serves to further 
marginalise them. ‘If security is a speech act’, Hansen (2000:306) suggests, ‘then it is 
simultaneously deeply implicated in the production of silence’. 
 
In many ways this focus on dominant voices in the construction of security is not a 
problem for the Copenhagen School alone. Traditional security proponents and some 
post-structuralists limit the number of actors deemed important in security terms in 
focusing on either state policy or dominant discourses. While Copenhagen School 
proponents allow the possibility for security actors and ‘securitisers’ other that state 
political leaders (Buzan et al. 1998:31-3), this move is ultimately closed off by the 
dual suggestions that security is ultimately about states (eg Wæver 1989:314; Wæver 
1995:47-9); and that security is articulated from a position of institutional power 
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(Wæver 1995:57; Buzan et al. 1998:32-3). The default position here is therefore a 
focus on the political leaders of states and their designations of threat. The 
methodological focus on speech acts might also be seen as relevant to this bias. As 
Jennifer Milliken (1999:243-5) has argued, the tendency to ignore subjugated 
knowledge or voices is a general inclination within discourse analytical approaches to 
international relations.   
 
In short, the focus only on dominant voices and their designation of security and 
threat is normatively problematic, contributing to the silencing of marginal voices and 
ignoring the ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest these 
security constructions. But it also has problematic implications analytically. First, and 
echoing criticisms noted above, it pays insufficient attention to the means through 
which particular articulations of security and threat become possible: how, for 
example, are marginal actors and their articulations of security silenced or 
marginalised? Focusing on these marginalised or subjugated actors could point to 
some of the ways in which ‘securitisation’ becomes possible, expanding the emphasis 
on ‘contexts’ noted in the previous section.  
 
Second, it arguably encourages the particular logic of security which the Copenhagen 
School embraces. A range of (often marginal) actors contest dominant logics or 
discourses of security and threat through articulating alternative (even emancipatory) 
discourses of security and threat rather than simply arguing for ‘desecuritisation’. 
Amnesty International’s campaign on human rights violations against Kurdish 
populations in Turkey in the 1990s, for example, particularly questioned the 
justification of these violations on the grounds of ‘security’. This was reflected in the 
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title of its publication, Turkey: No Security Without Human Rights. For such actors, 
security (defined in non-statist, non-exclusionary and non-militaristic ways) can be a 
means for- or site of- emancipatory change. For the so-called Welsh School of critical 
security studies, focusing on the marginalised and ‘voiceless’ (Wyn Jones 1999:159) 
points to the ways in which potentially exclusionary, statist and militaristic security 
discourses can be challenged and replaced without simply giving up on security as a 
political category. Here, it could be argued that the choice within the Copenhagen 
School to ultimately limit attention to powerful actors and voices blinds its proponents 
to the role of security as a site of competing discourses or images of politics, and even 
potentially as a site for emancipation. Narrowness in this context has important 
normative implications that those using the framework would do well to reflect upon. 
 
Beyond the ‘Moment’ 
 
In the securitisation framework, issues become security issues at a particular moment. 
When this moment is may be up for question and based on particular readings of the 
Copenhagen School literature itself: it may be at the point when an issue is defined as 
a security issue (the speech act), at the point where an audience ‘backs up’ or 
acquiesces to that designation of threat, or at the point at which extraordinary 
measures are implemented. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s securitisation of Saddam 
Hussein’s ‘WMD programme’ for the British public in the lead up to the 2003 
invasion is a useful case study here. Depending on our reading of the Copenhagen 
School, the ‘securitisation’ of Saddam and his ‘WMD programme’ may have occurred 
exclusively through public representations depicting the regime and its WMD 
programme as imminently threatening, through the vote in Parliament legitimising 
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Blair’s deployment of troops, or even at the point of invasion itself. While the latter 
might seem the least likely reading, in Regions and Powers Buzan and Wæver 
(2003:73) look for examples of securitisation in the execution of emergency measures 
themselves rather than in the discursive construction of threat or societal acquiescence 
to these speech acts. The potential tensions between a focus on speech, acceptance or 
emergency measures maps on to an earlier point about the problematic relationship 
between speaker, audience and action. The important point to note here, however, is 
that the moment of securitisation is relatively specifically defined: issues become 
security threats at particular instances. 
 
Such an explicit or ‘decisionistic’ (Williams 2003:521) approach to the point at which 
threats are designated is not without its appeal. At times, radical changes in 
articulations of security and threat occur in global politics, as responses to perceived 
moments of political crisis for example.16
                                                 
16 Stuart Croft (2006), for example, discusses the ways in which the (albeit constructed) crisis of 
September 11, 2001, allowed for a significant change in articulations of security and threat in the 
United States. 
 Yet focusing on the moment at which an 
issue becomes a security issue is analytically problematic for at least three reasons. 
First, issues can come to be viewed as security issues or threats over an extended 
period of time. As Didier Bigo (2002) has argued, issues can become institutionalised 
as security issues or threats without dramatic moments of intervention. Using the 
example of the construction of immigrants as a security threat, Bigo suggests that the 
incorporation of issues relating to immigration within the jurisdiction of security 
professionals such as the police and the military should be viewed as central to the 
construction of this issue as a security threat. Jef Huysmans (2006) makes a similar 
point in his argument concerning the institutionalisation of immigration as a security 
threat in the European context. Such potentially long-term processes and practices fit 
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uneasily within the securitisation framework with its focus on ‘moments’ of 
intervention and the suspension of normal politics.  
  
Second, and again echoing an earlier point, focusing on the moment of intervention 
does not help us understand how or why that particular intervention became possible 
at that moment. Why then, and in that context, did a particular actor represent an issue 
as an existential threat, and more importantly why was that actor supported in that 
securitisation by a particular constituency?17
 
 Lipschutz (1995:8), for example, defines 
discourses of security and threat as ‘the products of historical structures and 
processes, of struggles for power within states, of conflicts between the societal 
groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them’. By contrast, for the 
Copenhagen School we can apply and understand a particular instance of 
securitisation without exploring fundamentally the contexts within which these 
interventions were possible in the first place. This would seem inconsistent with a 
broader understanding of the (inter-subjective) processes through which security is 
constructed in different contexts. 
Finally, a focus on the ‘moment’ at which an issue becomes a security issue and 
enters the realm of ‘panic politics’ is problematic because of the dichotomies it 
represents between security and politics. As Rita Abrahamsen (2005:59) has argued, 
focusing on a moment at which an issue ceases to be a political issue and becomes a 
security one suggests an either/or approach to politics in which there are no gradations 
or continuums of issue/problem/threat. Issues may be viewed as risks, for example, 
before being depicted as threats. Such a conceptualisation suggests a particular way of 
                                                 
17 On this point, see for example Fierke (1997); Hansen (2000:300); Hughes (2007); Stritzel 
(forthcoming). 
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approaching that issue,18 but for the securitisation framework the only fundamental 
difference is between an issue that is a political issue and one that is a security threat. 
A focus on the ‘moment’ here contributes to this narrow vision of political 
prioritisation and a problematic dichotomy between politics and security. This 
dichotomy might look even more problematic if taken outside the realm of liberal 
democratic Western states, which has provided the site for the development of the 
framework and is the overwhelming focus of its application.19
 
   
The example of the Australian government’s approach to asylum-seekers arriving by 
boat in 2001 provides a useful example of the limitations of the focus on the moment 
of discursive intervention. The dramatic naval blockade of a cargo ship- the Tampa- 
which had rescued over 400 asylum-seekers attempting to reach Australia by boat in 
August 2001 captured international headlines and seemed a clear example of 
securitisation. The blockade- entailing the deployment of the military and the 
rejection of elements of international refugee law- was accompanied by language 
from the highest levels of government depicting asylum-seekers as an immediate 
threat to security. Yet while we seem to have securitising moves, audience consent, 
and extraordinary measures in a relatively limited period of time (August-September 
2001), the focus on this moment obscures or ignores crucial elements of the 
construction of security. Asylum-seekers in Australia had arguably been constructed 
as a security threat since at least the mid-1990s, evidenced in the anti-immigration 
rhetoric of the right-wing nationalist Pauline Hanson and manifested in the 
establishment of detention centres for the incarceration of asylum-seekers. At best for 
the securitisation framework, these developments created a context in which the 
                                                 
18 See for example Beck (1999) and Aradau and van Munster (2007). 
19 See, for example, Wilkinson (2007). 
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conservative government’s ‘securitisation’ of asylum in 2001 became possible. At 
worst, asylum-seekers had been positioned as security threats incrementally, a process 
beginning well before the dramatic events and ‘securitising’ language of August-
September 2001.20
 
 At this level, it might be suggested that the securitisation 
framework does not provide us with the tools for understanding some of the most 
important dynamics of that which it proposes to explain.  
Beyond Threats? 
 
In the securitisation framework, the study of security is ultimately the study of the 
designation of threat. In this framework, an issue is a security issue if positioned as a 
threat to a particular political community. This commitment to the study of ‘threats’ is 
based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: 
by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or 
protection (Wæver 1995:56). Such a commitment is consistent also with the 
oppositional conception of identity in the securitisation framework, wherein who we 
are is determined by the designation of (threatening) others.21
 
 In short, we can learn 
all we need to know about the construction of security through studying the issues that 
are represented as existential threats. 
As Michael Williams (2003) has suggested, this oppositional view of the politics of 
security is related to the Copenhagen School’s indebtedness to the political theory of 
Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, politics in general is characterised by enmity and 
                                                 
20 For a more detailed account of the positioning of asylum-seekers as a security threat in the Australian 
context, see McMaster (2002) or McDonald (2005). 
21 On the role of the discursive production of danger in giving meaning to security and constituting 
identity see for example Klein (1990); Dalby (1990); Campbell (1992); Weldes et al eds (1999); Fierke 
(2007:chapter 5). 
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exclusion, with the sovereign’s designation of threatening ‘others’ central to political 
life and allowing the ‘exception’: the suspension of the normal rules of politics. For 
the securitisation framework, such a vision of politics is particularly applicable to the 
realm of security, which is characterised by the articulation of threat and ‘emergency 
measures’ enabled by that articulation. The Copenhagen School suggests that this 
political dynamic captures something timeless about the logic of security itself, with 
the realm of security an arena of exclusion and ‘panic politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 
34). This view of the logic of security has been central to their call for 
desecuritisation, a point I will return to in a moment. 
 
Representations of threat- pivotal to Schmittian security politics- can of course be 
viewed as constitutive of security and identity. As Simon Dalby has argued, the 
designation of that from which we need to be protected is crucial in telling us ‘who 
we are, what we value and what we are prepared to countenance to protect our self-
preferred identities’ (Dalby 2002:xxx). But is this the only way in which security is 
constructed, and what do we miss through focusing only on the designation of threat? 
I suggest here that while central, a focus on the designation of threat alone risks 
missing much about the construction of security, especially through privileging the 
‘content’ of security over its meaning in particular contexts. 
 
As noted, Roxanne Lynn Doty (1998/9) has suggested that radically different 
approaches to immigration can be understood in the context of different discourses of 
security. For Doty, changing approaches to the treatment of Haitian refugees by the 
US government in the 1990s can primarily- and contra the Copenhagen School- be 
understood as a change in the way security itself was understood. And I have 
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suggested elsewhere (McDonald 2003) that significant change in the Brazilian 
government’s approach to Amazonian deforestation in the late 1980s- from 
conceptualising the intact rainforest as a threat to Brazil to positioning it as that in 
need of being protected as part of Brazil- can be better understood as a change in 
perceptions or discourses of security rather than as an instance of ‘de-securitisation’. 
Here, articulations of the values in need of being protected were more prominent- and 
I would suggest more politically significant- than articulations of ‘from what or whom 
we need protection’. The focus on the designation of threat alone therefore tells a 
partial story of how security is given meaning, marginalising inclusive and non-statist 
definitions of ‘our values’ that tell us how security is understood in particular 
contexts. More problematically, the Copenhagen School image of security as 
acquiring meaning (or more accurately content) through the articulation of threat 




The ‘fixedness’ of the Copenhagen School’s logic of security has been taken up by 
‘Welsh School’ critical security theorists, for whom the study of security should be 
geared towards recognising and advancing opportunities for emancipation of the most 
vulnerable. Ken Booth (2005:207) and Paul Williams (2004:144), for example, have 
suggested that the securitisation framework is parasitic upon traditional (Realist) 
discourses of security that are taken as indicative of a universal and timeless logic of 
security. This is evident, for these theorists, in the Copenhagen School’s commitment 
to strict boundaries of inclusion and exclusion; to the state and state political leaders’ 
centrality in defining (usually external) threats and responses to them; and to the 
                                                 
22 On this point, see also Huysmans (2004) and Aradau (2004). 
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association of security means and tools with the most significant of ‘emergency 
measures’: military action. This constitutes an important normative problem, arguably 
serving to reify and normalise these traditional statist, exclusionary and militaristic 
approaches to security. Indeed, the idea that the Copenhagen School’s logic of 
security is both relatively fixed and politically conservative is a feature of even 
sympathetic readings of the securitisation framework (Huysmans 1998:500-1; Hansen 
2000:286).  
 
In this context, key proponents of the Copenhagen School (Wæver 1995; 2000:253; 
2004;  Buzan and Wæver 1998:204-9) have argued in favour of de-securitisation: the 
removal of issues from the security agenda. While recognising the possibility for 
securitisation to be progressive (eg Wæver 2000:285), the general suggestion is that 
‘it is better…to aim for desecuritisation’ (Buzan and Wæver 1998:4). Here, the 
Schmittian logic of security can be avoided and issues returned to the open and 
deliberative realm of normal politics. Important issues surface again here about what 
constitutes normal politics and about the relatively simplistic distinction between 
‘security’ and ‘politics’. Analytically, it is certainly possible to suggest that rather 
than constituting the opposite realm to that of politics, debates around what 
constitutes security and how ‘we’ should act to achieve or preserve it are particularly 
politically intense, even a form of ‘hyper-politics’. The logic of security upon which 
the securitisation framework is based might be contested again here, most 
prominently the suggestion that security ‘speech acts’ can themselves take issues 
outside the political realm.  
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But the suggestion that we should aim for ‘desecuritisation’ is also normatively 
problematic. It depicts security as a failure of ‘normal politics’ rather than recognising 
security as a site of contestation and therefore for (even emancipatory) change. This is 
especially important if security is still that most powerful of political categories- 
defining political priority, a community’s identity and its core values. The focus only 
on the negative designation of threat serves the interests of those who benefit from 
dominant negative and exclusionary articulations of threat in contemporary 
international politics, further silencing voices articulating alternative visions for what 
security means and how it might be realised.  
 
The Construction of Security Beyond Copenhagen 
 
At one level, it is profoundly unfair to define ‘key questions’ for the study of a 
particular phenomena and then suggest that approaches which do something different- 
something more narrow and specific- fail to engage with such questions. But it is also 
important to point to the limits and silences of those approaches. In the case of the 
securitisation framework, one compelling reason for pointing to these limits and 
silences is precisely because ‘securitisation’ is often presented as shorthand for the 
construction of security. This tendency is more characteristic of applications of the 
framework than conceptual elaborations of it by key proponents, but is furthered or 
reinforced by the central role these theorists have played in ‘widening’ security 
debates. In this context, this article has sought to point to important distinctions 
between the construction of security and the narrower concern with the discursive 
positioning of threats. The latter, I have suggested here, neglects the historical and 
social contexts in which designations of security and threat become possible, and the 
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question of how particular voices within political communities are empowered or 
marginalised in speaking security.  
 
At another level, it is unfair to suggest that theories include all things relevant to a 
particular issue or dynamic, particularly given the apparently infinite ways in which 
the construction of security is influenced in any given context. And yet if in their 
narrowness theories fail to identify or provide the basis for explaining/understanding 
some of the most significant dimensions of that which they seek to focus on, this 
would seem worthy of drawing out. In this article, I have suggested that the 
implications of defining an issue as a security issue, for example, are dependent less 
on the designation of threat in itself than of the way in which security is understood in 
particular contexts. Taking this point seriously means questioning the Schmittian 
logic of security upon which the securitisation framework is based. 
 
Finally, we could certainly expect that issues or dynamics recognised as important to 
the process being examined (such as the role of ‘audiences’ or ‘normal politics’ in 
securitisation) might be incorporated within the framework itself. I have suggested 
here that the failure to elaborate on the context of the speech act, in particular the role 
of audiences, ultimately leaves such questions outside the framework itself. This is 
problematic for an approach that both recognises the importance of this dynamic and 
suggests an inter-subjective approach to the designation of threat. Here, I have 
suggested the possibility of strengthening the framework through elaborating on and 
incorporating these dimensions, even while pointing to some of the prior assumptions 
that might make this more difficult than it at first appears. 
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Beyond the analytical rationale for exploring the narrowness of the securitisation 
framework, we certainly need to be acutely aware of the normative implications of 
narrowness. Building on existing critiques, I have pointed to some of the problematic 
normative implications of the framework, particularly in terms of reifying dominant 
voices in speaking security and reifying traditional security discourses. While some 
degree of narrowness is necessary for a theory, the choice of issues to include and 
exclude may have important normative implications that those seeking to apply it 
must reflect upon.    
 
Of course, a theory or conceptual framework cannot do everything. It is therefore 
inappropriate to ask whether a particular theory does everything. There are, however, 
still important questions to ask about theory: Does it do what it says it’s going to do? 
Does it provide a framework for addressing the most important elements of the 
phenomena it’s trying to explain? And what are the implications of the choices made 
to focus on some things and not others? In a small way this article has attempted to 
ask these questions of the securitisation framework. While all of the answers provided 
here can and should be contested, some of them have suggested the possibility for the 
further development of the theory, others have suggested the need to reflect upon the 
normative commitments and implications of the framework, and others have pointed 
to the need for those applying the framework to recognise the limits of the framework 
itself. Taken together, these suggestions might develop further an important and 
innovative framework for understanding the ways in which issues are constructed as 
security threats in contemporary world politics. 
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The above of course raises the question of what future research on the construction of 
security might look like, and what role within the research the Copenhagen School 
might play. As noted, the securitisation framework is excellent in capturing the 
importance of discursive interventions in positioning issues as security threats, 
particularly in the post-September 11, 2001 context and the designation of threat by 
political leaders in Western liberal democracies (upon whose institutions and 
dynamics its conception of ‘normal politics’ arguably relies).As noted, however, it is 
ultimately more limited in allowing us to understand why these interventions would 
be successful (here we need a broader sense of the context of these interventions in 
particular), and in assuming that contemporary states’ security discourses capture 
something inevitable and timeless about the logic of security. Analytically we need to 
recognise and explore the range of ways in which political communities and their 
values are positioned by different actors, and explore the contexts in which particular 
security visions ‘win out’ over others. We should also focus more on the 
understanding or discourse of security underpinning particular representations and 
practices rather than the act of ‘securitising’ or ‘desecuritising’. Such a research 
agenda is clearly less elegant and more unwieldy than the Copenhagen School’s 
securitisation framework, whose attraction will always in part be the desire to simply 
apply a set of universal and ready-made tools to different social, historical and 
political contexts. But resisting this attraction means recognising the breadth and 
complexity of the construction of security in global politics.  
 
A broader framework would therefore have analytical value, but would also have 
potentially progressive normative implications. In understanding how particular 
visions of security and the voices promoting them come to prominence, we can better 
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understand how alternative security discourses (that reject militarism, statism and 
exclusion, for example) can replace them. Such a praxeological or normative concern 
with acknowledging possibilities for emancipatory change would work well if 
combined with that which the Copenhagen School is able to contribute: a sociological 
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